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A Message from the
President
August 28, 1940.
To the Members of the Denver Bar Association:
It has been suggested that some space in DICTA might to advantage
be devoted to reporting currcnt activities of the Board of Trustees and
the committees, to the end that you may be better informed as to what
is happening and what may be expected. I favor the suggestion and take
this opportunity to mention briefly some of the more important happenings and features of the program which are contemplated for the current
year.
THE BLUE CROSS PLAN
The Board of Trustees, after conferring with William S. McNary,
Executive Director of the Colorado Hospital Association, and considering the proposal, has approved the plan for members of this association.
As a result, members may now enroll to receive the benefits of hospitalization which it offers. You will receive more detailed information in a
letter from Mr. McNary.
Under the plan any member of this association may enroll, pay a
monthly or semi-annual schedule of rates and thereby receive hospitalization for himself or family in any one of fourteen Class A hospitals in
Denver, Colorado Springs or Pueblo who are members of the Colorado
Hospital Association sponsoring the plan. Further features include hospitalization expense in any hospital if desired. The plan is managed by
a Board of Trustees composed of public-spirited citizens who serve without pay. It is patterned after similar plans which have been in successful
operation for some time in other states. The trustees have approved the
plan in order that it might be made available to any member of this association who may wish to take advantage of its benefits.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONVENTION
Suggestion that American Bar be invited to Denver in 1941 considered by special committee and trustees. Unanimous action favored postponing invitation until later-perhaps 1943. Indianapolis will probably issue invitation for next year. New York City in 1942 seems likely.
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Reasons for postponement:
lems of importance first.

Unsettled conditions, finances, local prob-

THE WATERMAN TRUST
The income in perpetuity from a trust fund which will in all probability aggregate several hundred thousand dollars will, following the
demise of three life tenants, come to this association to be used preferentially for alleviating financial distress of aged members. This benefaction is the result of the generosity of Mrs, Waterman, widow of the late
Senator Charles Waterman, whose will so provided.
DICTA
DICTA editorial staff favors more articles of practical benefit to lawyers, some space for current Bar activities and committee reports, and
improved method of reporting Supreme Court decisions by R. Hickman
Walker assisted by 0. A. Phipps, all decisions being reported, most important summarized.
MEETINGS
Predominance of talks on subjects of practical value with occasional
purely social meetings, possibly evening dinners. Those considering
selves with voice see Irving Hale for a Bar quartet.
LEGAL INSTITUTE
Several afternoon Institute sessions planned. Lectures on subjects
of general interest by specialist members, after the style of the successful
institutes sponsored by Colorado Bar Association.
MEMBERSHIP
Strenuous effort to bring in new members and rehabilitate few old
ones whose interest or dues have lagged. Communicate with me or
Secretary Woods if your delinquent dues have reached staggering proportions.
These are in brief a few of the features of the program. We solicit
suggestions or criticism. I respectfully suggest that every lawyer will
receive from this and from membership in the Colorado Bar Association
a total of at least $7 of value. If you agree, send Woods your check
if you haven't already done so.
Cordially yours,
BENJAMIN E. SWEET, President.

More "Old Stuff" About

Administrative
Findings of Fact
By FRANK SWANCARA*
So many papers on Administrative Law have been published that
a further contribution seems "old stuff," but zeal for the cause of judicial review of administrative findings of fact impels renewal of some
argument on that point.
Administrative agencies, state and federal, are multitudinous, and
what is the advisable scope of judicial review as to one, or a number of
them, may not be so as to others. In a short paper referring to such tribunals as a whole, generalities and dogmatism are unavoidable.
All fact-finders on conflicting evidence are fallible. "Findings of
fact" give administrative agencies the occasion, and often the excuse, for
the exercise of power over an individual. Such findings may be inaccurate or false. A board with good intentions may unwittingly injure a
respondent needlessly. Again, misfeasance and malfeasance in office is
encouraged because seldom suspected. Many officials are unduly flattered
while countervailing facts are undisclosed or disbelieved. Incompetency,
malice or arbitrary conduct of some bureaucrats can be concealed from
the general public by the pretense of exercising "discretion."' Many men
do, or would, abuse authority. That is why we honor the exceptions,
and Ingersoll appropriately said: "It is the glory of Lincoln that, having
almost absolute power, he never abused it, except upon the side of
mercy.
Actualities as indicated by the factual situations and orders in some
proceedings, and the possibilities thereby suggested, furnish rational,
and inspire emotional, support for a much broader system of review than
that involved in the predominant practice of giving finality to administrative findings whenever there is some evidence, however, weak, in their
favor.
Many factors contribute to the need of checks upon the fact-finding
powers of administrators. The power to make conclusive findings
where there is evidence both ways is "of enormous consequence,"' and
obviously the power may be misused or abused where wielded by officials
whose fitness is impaired by unstable tenure, political or group pressure,
or the necessity of conducting an investigation as, or from the viewpoint
of, a complainant. Where the administrator has acted as prosecutor or
in some other capacity incompatible with that of an impartial judge,
disqualifying thoughts and emotions enter into the process of arriving
at the expressed decision on the facts. Where influential officials or
*Of the Denver Bar.

'Chief Justice Hughes, Feb. 11, 1931: see 17 A. B. A. Journal, 237, 238.
Accord. Elihu Root, 41 A. B. A. Rep. 355, 369 (1916).
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groups manifest a desire for a particular result, the examiner or commissioner may ostensibly become accordant, and find as if he is, though truth
and justice would dictate a contrary result. The psychological determinants of his judgment may be opposed to the interests of the humble,
weak or inarticulate. While he has no pecuniary interest and apparently
is only trying to do his duty, there is nevertheless "a tendency to decide
on the basis of matters not before the tribunal or on evidence not produced, " 2 or only on that part of the evidence which supports the wishes
of a party or pressure group with whom he is in secret sympathy or fears
to offend. Most of the decisions which aggrieve parties are not upon
legal questions but upon facts as they exist or are "found" to be.
The "defects of administrative justice"' are such that a board may
needlessly oppress an economic interest, or unjustly deprive a citizen of
the right to carry on his usual occupation, or in some other way burden
a respondent, not by the old-fashioned judicial methods which safeguard rights and seek the truth, but by "ignoring the weight of the evidence," or, without familiarity with the evidence, adopting recommendations of prejudiced examiners. Bureaucratic tyranny can best be prevented or discouraged by the right to judicial reexamination of the factual
basis of the administrative action, in some cases by an independent commission, but generally by the courts. The latter should be empowered
to enforce their own views of the relative weight of the evidence. The
prevailing system of giving finality to facts which have some evidence in
their support makes false findings also effective if coming within the rule,
and that is making the innocent suffer. When, with no right to effective
review, an individual is penalized by an order based. on findings which
untruthfully, possibly libelously, describe his conduct, he, family and
friends become embittered against the acting tribunal and others of its
class. The memory of any kind of a judicial or administrative lynching
tortures its victim for life.
Findings on non-technical evidence.
While administrators or deputies who personally conduct hearings
are as qualified as veniremen for ascertaining ultimate facts, still conditions increasing reliability of verdicts are absent with respect to findings.
With no challenge, either leremptory or for cause, parties must accept
the administrative triers of fact as they find them. A board's personnel
is practically unchanging, and hearings teand to become "perfunctory
routine, ' ' 4 and there is indifference to exact truth or consequences to individuals. On the other band, jurors serve for brief periods, and while on
duty they bestow undivided and critical attention to the testimony and
its givers. They remain separated from persons interested in the result.
'1938 Report, Special Committee on Administrative Law, A. B. A., 63 A. B. A.
Rep. 331, 347.
'Ibid.. p. 346.
'1938 Report, Sp. Comm. Adms. L., A. B. A.
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They must agree without compromise, and upon preponderance of the
evidence. The jury is the most dependable discoverer of truth on conflicting evidence, and yet persons with just causes are often so fearful of
adverse results before a jury that they avoid any adversary proceeding.
Something that hinders accurate fact-finding does get into the jury box,
but much is kept out. If even good juries intermittently err, boards will
do worse.
If a fact-finding board resembles the equity judge more than it does
the jury, the fact remains, as previously pointed out, that the board i's
apt to have disqualifying attributes which the judge has not, and administrators are often beset by outside influences which would not approach
a court. Reasons for the necessity of having the "findings of fact of a
trained equity or admiralty judge subject to complete review- 5 apply
also to the findings of a commissioner who is "many things that a judge
is not, and is not many things that a judge is,"" particularly in care to
avoid acting upon untested factual assumptions.
Findings on technical evidence.
Where a board deals with matters where it must make expert interpretation of data which are intrinsically uncontroverted, it is in the position of a judge who must find on technical evidence. Reasons for judicial
review on the facts still remain, even where the administrator is more
expert than the judge. Even a non-expert is capable of criticizing the
findings of an expert for the reason, among others, that to test findings
already formulated requires less expertness than to originate them. If
the reviewing court regards the commission as impartial and expert, the
original determination, unless clearly wrong, would be affi'rmed, and the
results of good administrative work preserved. The power to modify
or reverse, on the facts, would be rarely exercised, but should exist because
its potentialiies discourage erroneous, careless or arbitrary action on the
part of boards judicially correctible.
Questionsstill timely as to state boards.
The prevailing practice through the nation is not only to deny a
trial de novo but also a review on the facts where a party aggrieved by an
administrative order takes a statutory appeal or brings certiorari. The
courts are compelled to affirm an order, unless questions of law require
the contrary, if there is any evidence to support the findings of fact. This
permits judicial sloth. Thus a judge without reading the transcript can
safely pretend that he has done so and found "substantial" evidence supporting the order complained of. But if, as he is presumed to do and
generally does, he actually reads the record, he is then able to say, sincerely, not only whether there is some evidence on the side of the findings,
but also whether or not the preponderance or weight is also accordant.
'Vanderbilt,
23 A. B. A. J. 871, 873 (1937).
8
Vanderbilt, 24 A. B. A. J. 267, 271 (1938).
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No additional time or labor is required for the determination of that
further question. This situation refutes the argument that a review on
the facts, as in the equity practice, would unduly burden the court and
cause delay. If the honest and diligent judge examines the whole record
carefully to decide legal questions, including those requiring some familiarity with the evidence, his court should not be paralyzed to reverse on
'discovery of an injustice scantily clad in contradicted evidence. Yet there
is legislation thus limiting the power of reviewing courts. The "little
Wagner acts," for example, contain the provision that "the findings of
the board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive."'
Where a state agency determines issues of fact arising between two
private parties, as in Workmen's Compensation cases, there is some excuse
for giving finality to the administrative findings, but not so where the
agency itself or a pressure group is assailing or investigating an individual.
In such cases horse sense perceives, and dietates keeping or securing, the
advantages which individuals have in a system whereby determinations
of issues of fact as well as of law are made, if not initially at least finally,
by an independent and specially qualified tribunal, restricted to adjudicating (not also investigating) functions. That system tends to insure
fairness and conformity to the truth.
With respect to some state agencies, trials de novo ought to be available, as illustrated by a North Carolina case where a physician whose
license was revoked could appeal to a court and have a jury trial.8 In
Washington such physician could have a trial de novo to the court. '
Ordinarily, however, only a review on the facts is enough. It is not
impractical. There is, or was, a statute in New York under which an
assessment for taxation could be contested on the ground of overvaluation, and testimony taken by a reviewing court.10 Statutory certiorari
or other kind of review can empower a court to pass upon the weight of
the evidence."
To foster administrative absolutism by retaining and enacting
statutes which give finality to findings of boards is to weaken appreciation, and imperil possession, of constitutional liberties which only the
courts steadfastly guard, and these tribunals are crippled by the statutes
in question. Sponsors of such statutes do not contemplate this situation, but desire only that their pet boards have as much power as
possible. The writing of some theorists, professors, and bureaucrats
favor limitation of judicial control, assuming that commissioners are
always impartial and expert. Hence the bar must remain the chief
defender and preserver of adequate judicial review, and thereby of the
constitutional system and rights which such review protects.
7

See section 11 (f), Chapter 55, Laws of Utah (1937).
'Board v. Carroll, 138 S. E. 339.
'Board
v. Macy, 159 Pac. 801.
"0Freund, Administrative Powers, etc., 269.
"Peo. v. Gibbons, 231 N. Y. 171.

COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION
619 Midland Savings Building
Denver, Colo.

COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
OFFICERS
President

-------

WILLIAM R. KELLY

WILLIAM E. HUTTON
..........--------------President-Elect---------------Senior Vice-President---------------------------------- EDWARD L. WOOD
f JACOB S. SCHEY
ROBERT TARBELL
Vice-Presidents-------------------.----------JUDGE JOHN R. CLARK
WM. HEDGES ROBINSON, JR.
....----------Secretary-----------EDWARD C. KING
----------------------Treasurer----BOARD OF GOVERNORS
Frank Moorhead
S. Arthur Henry
James A. Woods
Dudley W. Strickland
A. K. Barnes

Wilbur F. Denious
Joseph G. Hodges
Leon H. Snyder
W. W. Gaunt
Geo. H. Wilkes
Fred W. Stover

Editor of Section

Charles M. Holmes
Herbert L. Strang
Marion F. Miller
Benj. F. Koperlik
Win. Atha Mason
Geo. M. Corlett

J. Edgar Chenoweth
Herschel Horn
George W. Lane
H. Lawrence Hinkley
Clay R. Apple

Wm. Hedges Robinson, Jr.. Denver
CORRESPONDENTS

Wilkie Ham, Lamar
John C. Banks. Grand Junction
Harlan Howlett, Boulder
Judge J. Edgar Chenoweth, Trinidad
John W. O'Hagan, Greeley
Charles Corlett. Monte Vista
Jesse E. Pound, Alamosa
George S. Cosand, La Junta
C. H. Darrow, Glenwood Springs
Charles Ribar, Pueblo
Dale E. Shannon, Fort Collins
George F. Dodge, Jr., Montrose
Charles J. Simon, Colorado Springs
James B. Garrison. Dolores
George C. Twombly, Fort Morgan
Address all communications and information for publication to 619 Midland
Savings Building, Denver, Colorado.

CALENDAR OF EVENTS
September 9Annual Meeting American.Bar Association
-Annual Meeting Colorado Bar Association
September 27-28
Annual --...
M eeting Colorado County Judges Association
--------...
September 28 ------September 29 ----- ............ ....................
M-eeting Colorado Junior Bar Conference
---------.Annual Meeting Colorado Association of District Attorneys
January, 1941 ------

225

Practical Benefits
to Lawyers
Is Keynote of Bar Convention
The program of the forty-third annual meeting of the State Bar
Association will feature sessions of practical benefit to the practicing
lawyer. The Friday afternoon session will present a discussion of the
proposed new rules of civil procedure for Colorado. After a brief statement by Chairman Philip S. Van Cise of Denver, the meeting will be
open for suggestions and criticisms by all the lawyers attending. In
order to eliminate confusion, fifteen lawyers who have specialized on
various parts of the code will be present to discuss any questions regarding the portion of the rules on which they worked. This meeting will
also afford attorneys a chance to familiarize themselves with the federal
rules, as the proposed code is fashioned largely after these rules.
Saturday morning two concurrent meetings will be held. One
session will devote itself to a discussion of underground waters and
the relationship of state and federal governments in water problems.
The other session will deal with wills and estates. Specific problems
such as sales, claims, bonds and notices will be discussed by various
county judges and practicing lawyers. This session will be under the
joint auspices of the State Bar and the County Judges Association
which will also meet at the Broadmoor on Saturday.
The Saturday afternoon meeting will be a symposium on trial
practice at which time Judge Claude C. Coffin of Fort Collins, Kenneth
Robinson of Denver, and John N. Mabry of Trinidad will speak.
The Convention Committee, headed by Edward L. Wood of
Denver, secured the acceptance of Robert H. Jackson, the attorneygeneral of the United States, who will speak Friday evening on "Trends
in Constitutional Law as Affecting Defense Problems."
The banquet program Saturday evening, which will close the
meeting, will be very brief. The only speaker of the evening will be
Jesse R. S. Budge of Salt Lake City. The subject of Mr. Budge's
address is: '.'Are We Too Late?" Mr. Budge, who is a candidate for
the Utah Supreme Court judgeship, is well known in his native state
as a witty and entertaining speaker.
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The County Judges Association, which is meeting in conjunction
with the State Bar, will have a business luncheon Saturday noon at
the hotel. Members of that Association are, of course, welcome, at any
of the sessions of the State Bar Meeting.
The Colorado Junior Bar Conference will hold its annual meeting
on Sunday, September 29th. After hearing reports from its officers and
committees, it will select officers for the coming year.
An extensive entertainment program has been planned. Friday's
luncheon again will be left to the Law Club of Denver to provide
entertainment. Those who attended last year will recall the enjoyable
program given by this club, and its president promises to exceed last
year's standard. The Junior Bar will be in charge of the Saturday
luncheon at which time Justice William Lee Knous of the State Supreme
Court will talk on "Improved Methods of Judicial Selection."
The Broadmoor Hotel is honoring the late Spencer Penrose by a
cocktail party late Saturday afternoon. Mr. Penrose who was a generous
friend of the State Association and extended to it many courtesies,
was host to the Association at a cocktail party last year.
A steak fry at Rotten Log Hollow will be another innovation on
this year's program. This event, which will be under the direction of
the hotel, will precede the address by Mr. Jackson. A complete two-day
program of entertainment for the ladies has been arranged by the El
-Paso County Bar Association.

Members of the Bar of the Fourteenth Judicial District met at
Craig on August 17th to formulate plans for becoming affiliated with
the State Bar. Judge Charles E. Herrick of Craig presided at the
meeting which was well attended. William R. Kelly of Greeley, State
Association President, addressed the group on the subject of the responsibility of the lawyer, and William E. Hutton, President-elect, spoke on
the various privileges enjoyed by members in the State Association.
Following these talks, a discussion of forming a local association
was had. It was the consensus of the meeting that because of the small
number of lawyers in the district a petition should be directed to the
Ninth District Bar Association requesting it to receive into its membership lawyers from Moffat, Routt and Grand Counties.. A committee
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consisting of Addison M. Gooding of Steamboat Springs, Farrington
R. Carpenter of Hayden, and Sidney M. Pleasant of Craig, were
appointed to negotiate with the Ninth District Association.
M. J. Mayes, president, and Judge Carl W. Fulghum, secretary of
the Ninth District Bar Association were present at the meeting and
explained the program and structure of their organization. They
agreed to lay the petition before the association for action before the
State Bar Meeting.
A similar decision-whether to affiliate with the Ninth District
Bar Association or to form a local association-will soon be made by
attorneys in the Fifth District consisting of Lake, Eagle and Summit
Counties. The scarcity of lawyers in this section has also delayed local
organization, but several attorneys within the district are working for
some form of local organization.

COLORADO REPORTS FOR SALE
Richard E. Conour of Del Norte offers for sale his Colorado Appeals
and Supreme Court Reports in order to avoid duplications in his library.
Any attorney interested should communicate directly with Mr. Conour.

THOMAS I. PURCELL NAMED PROSECUTOR AT
COLORADO SPRINGS
Thomas I. Purcell, assistant district attorney for the fourth judicial
district since 1933, has been appointed to fill the unexpired term of
District Attorney Clyde L. Starrett, who died August 30th.
The appointment was made September 3rd by District Judges John
E. Little and John M. Meikle, and Purcell immediately filed bond.
Purcell is a candidate on the Democratic ticket for the district office.
Unless a candidate is elected November 5 for the short term, he will serve
by appointment until the full term begins in January.

Supreme Court Decisions
The editors announce that beginning with the October issue every
case decided by the Colorado Supreme Court since the last preceding
issue will be mentioned under this section, along with a brief notation
as to its subject matter and holding. This, it is hoped, will prove
useful in keeping the bar and bench in touch with all the current unreported cases. The practice of digesting and commenting upon peculiarly significant and interesting decisions will not be discontinued, although shortage of space may require some abbreviation.
No. 14760. Livingston v. Utah-ColoradoLamb, Etc. Co., Decided June 10, 1940. Exemplary Damages Are Not Recoverable in
Tort Case Where Jury Finds No Actual Damages.
The general rule is recited to be that exemplary damages are not
recoverable in the absence of actual damages. Colorado, however, is
committed to the liberal view that upon a showing of actual damage,
even in the absence of proof or finding as to its amount, recovery of
punitive damages will be sustained. McConathy v. Deck, 34 Colo.
461, 83 P. 135, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 358, 7 Ann. Cas. 896; Authorities
to the contrary are noted.
It is necessary to distinguish this case, where the finding was of
no actual damage, from a case of mere failure to find or assess actual
damages.
Judgment below on verdict for no actual damages and $100.00
punitive damages. Reversed.
No. 14690. Estate of Sabray Morrish; Wheeler v. Morrish, Decided June 24, 1940. "Person Aggrieved" With Respect to Appeals
from Judgments of the County Court in Estate Matters, as the Term
Is Used in Ch. 46, Section 165, C.S.A., Includes the Widower and Sole
Heir of the Deceased, who may carry an appeal from judgment allowing
a claim, although not technically a party'to the County Court action.
District Court accepted jurisdiction of the appeal. Affirmed.

No. 14763. Denny v. People, Decided July 1, 1940. A Sealed
Verdict in a Felony Trial, does not satisfy the requirements of Ch. 48,
Section 493, C.S.A. where the return of the same was delayed by the
action of the trial judge in instructing the jury in the absence of the de-
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fendant and his counsel that "Opening of Court for this case will be
January 30, 1940, at 10:00 A. M."
A week of unexplained delay.
Conviction below of larceny from the person. Reversed.
No. 14741. Brannaman, et at. v,. Richlow Manufacturing Company, Decided July 1, 1940. Taxation Under State Unemployment
Compensation Act. Held that the non-paid secretary of plaintiff corporation, is not an employee; therefore the corporation had less than
eight employees in 1937. and 1938 and was not subject to the tax paid
by it under protest.
The State contends:
(a)
That the secretary is included under Section 19 (g) (1) defining employment: "Employment means service performed for wages
or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied."
(b)
That she is included by Section 19 (f) (7) by reference
to the federal definition of "employee" contained in Section 1607 (i)
title 26 U.S.C.A.: "The term 'employee' includes an officer of a corporation."
The court indicates some doubt as to the constitutionality of the
reference definition supposed under contention (b) above, if it were
indeed intended; but holds that in any case the State definition controls
and that it does not include the secretary. Judgment below invalidating the collection of the tax. Modified and affirmed. Bock, J., dissents.
No. 14789. Adams, et al. v. IndustrialCommission of Colorado,
et al. Decided August 7, 1940. Course of Employment Under the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
Claimant was riding at the time of his injury with the driver of
employer's delivery truck. Testimony conflicting as to why he was
there, claimant asserting that it was to learn the route of the truck in
order to take over the delivery upon or in case of the absence of the
regular driver; employer that it was on mere joy ride.
On such conflicting evidence the finding below that claimant was
injured in the course of employment will not be disturbed. Judgment
for claimant affirmed.
No. 14604. Townsend v. Heath, et al., Decided June 10, 1940.
Oral Joint Contracts Are Not Joint and Several despite Ch. 92, Sec. 4
of C.S.A. and Section 14 of the Code. Dismissal below as to other
joint contractors and judgment for plaintiff against one defendant, reversed.
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No. 14650. Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson
County, et al. u. The Rocky Mountain Water Co. Decided June 10,
1940. Injunction Against Enforcement of Confiscatory Water Rate
Allowed and Affirmed, the Supreme Court Refusing to Suggest a Rate.
No. 14777. Monte Investment Company v. Derby. Decided
June 10, 1940.
Appeal by defendant from judgment of Justice of the Peace in
unlawful detention action, without filing the additional bond for use
and occupation required by Ch. 70, Sec. 23 C.S.A. must be dismissed
on motion. The judgment for defendant is reversed.
No. 14759. Snyder v. Schmoyer. Decided June 17, 1940.
11. District Court has jurisdiction on Habeas Corpus writ by
one parent against another for the person of their child.
2. Dependency petition to give Juvenile Court jurisdiction must
be filed bona fide, for some real, not fancied, cause and not as an excuse
to relitigate questions previously decided by another Court. Decree
ordering custody of the child given to the father according to the judgment of the Montana Divorce Court.
No. 14632. Cline, et al. v. Friend. Decided June 24, 1940.
Jurisdiction of damages on appeal bond conditioned to pay damages incident to delay as assessed by Supreme Court does not rest in
the district court but in the Supreme Court.
No. 14597. School District v. Faker. Decided July 1, 1940.
A school Board and its employee, a teacher, may compromise and
settle the latter's right to a pension.
No. 14617. Coates v. People. Decided July 1, 1940.
Sentence of death for murder in the first degree sustained. Certain
errors in the admission of evidence held non-prejudicial and judgment
affirmed.

No. 14387. Otto Lbr. Co. v. Water Supply and Storage Co.
Decided July 1, 1940.
Petition for change of point of diversion of water. District Court
held to have jurisdiction of petition by Wyoming Corporation despite
recent Colorado vs. Wyoming water litigation. Reversed.
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No. 14627. Midwest Mutual v. Heald. Decided July 17, 1940.
Action on written contract for attorney's fees. General allegation
in complaint of performance of conditions precedent and no specific
denial. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.

No. 14657. Sweeney v. Peterson, et al. Decided June 17, 1940.
Reformation of trust on ground of mistake of trustor at the instance of a donee who is not the "natural object of the donor's bounty",
here a mere stranger, will be denied. Trial court denied relief. Affirmed.

No. 14796. Workmen's Compensation; Statute of Limitations.
Decided August 7, 1940. Weidensaul v. Industrial Commission, et al.
District Court, Denver. Hon. Stanley H. Johnson, Judge. Affirmed.
In Dept.
HELD: 1. Where claimant's doctor is told that employer would
resist claim on ground claimant was an independent contractor and
doctor fails to notify claimant and more than one year elapses before
claim is made, it is fault of claimant since doctor was his agent.
2. There is nothing in the record to convince court that claimant should be excused from compliance with statute because of physical
and mental incapacity. Record shows that while he suffered from
shock for a few days after accident, he admitted he was mentally alert
thereafter and that his niece volunteered to look after the matter for him.
Claimant has precluded himself from being covered by case
3.
of Colorado Springs v. Colburn, 102 Colo. 483, 81 P. (2d) 397, by
admitting he entrusted the whole matter to his friend, the doctor.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Burke concur.
No. 14627. Attorney and Client; Contracts; Pleading. Decided July 17, 1940. Midwest Mutual, Inc. v. Heald. District
Court, Denver. Hon. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge. Affirmed. In Dept.
I.
In a suit on a contract for legal services, the allegaHELD:
tion that the plaintiff "has duly performed all the conditions of said
contract, on his part to be done and performed," while essentially a
legal conclusion, is proper and in compliance with the Code of Civil
Procedure ('35 C. S. A., Volume 1, Page 155, Section 72).
2. Although plaintiff had prepared the articles of incorporation
for the corporators of the defendant corporation, he did not become the
attorney for the corporation until about a year later. The contract
was not entered into during the existence of the fiduciary relationship
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of attorney and client, and therefore it was not incumbent upon him to
prove the fairness.and reasonableness of the contract or the reasonable
worth of the compensation provided for.
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the
defendant permission to file a second amended answer, tendered after
the case had been called for trial and the jurors had been empaneled
and sworn.
4. Although the contract gave the defendant the option of paying plainftiff in investment certificates rather than cash, under the facts,
even if the alleged error had been properly assigned, the supreme court
holds that the trial court did not err in entering a money judgment.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice Knous concur.
No. 14561.
Zoning. People ex rel. Gromrnmon v. Hedgcock,
etc. Decided May 24, 1940. District Court, Denver. Hon. Henry
S. Lindsley, Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
A. Action brought to compel building inspector of the
FACTS:
City and County of Denver to issue a permit for the construction of a
"bungalow court" in a "Business B" district.
B. The lower court found that the design of the proposed improvement made it in fact an "automobile tourist camp" and refused
the relief requested.
HELD:
1. It is admitted that under Section 3B of the zoning
ordinance, the erection of a multiple dwelling, hotel, dormitory or
boarding house or rooming house is a permitted use in a "Business B"
district.
2. A structure having a central building, with a central heating
plant, surrounded by sixteen apartments, with bath, kitchenette, living
room, and bedroom in each, available to permanent tenants and transients, is a bungalow court and falls within the classification of a multiple dwelling and not an "automobile tourist camp."
It is of no consequence that the structure may or probably will
3.
be rented to transients.
4. " 'The power to limit the use of real estate in particular
districts must be expressely granted or rise by necessary implication.' "
"The police power, which is the legal basis for zoning regulations, must
constantly be reconciled with the legitimate use of private property in
harmony with such guarantees."
5.
Section 4, Article VI of the zoning ordinances requires the
issuance, in a "Business B" district, of a permit for the erection of any
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structure intended or designed to be used for "* * * any use not provided for as a permitted use in any other district * * *."

6. The name used to designate the structure is immaterial.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Young, Mr. Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Burke concur. Mr.
Justice Bakke dissents.
No. 14690. Estates; Appeal by Heir; Bond. In re Estate of
Marrish. Wheeler v. Marrish. Decided May 24, 1940. District
Court Larimer County. Hon. Claude C. Coffin, Judge. Affirmed.
In Dept.
HELD:
1. "Any person aggrieved" may take an appeal from
the county court to the district court; and this includes an heir who
objects to a judgment of the county court on a claim against the estate.
2. There is no statutory provision requiring an order from the
county court allowing such appeals if a bond is filed and approved
within ten days after the order or decree of the county court has been
rendered. It is only where time is asked "upon good cause" that any
order of the court is necessary.
3. Although there may have been some informalities in connection with the giving of the bond, the sureties thereon apparently
were responsible, and, the bond having been duly approved by the
court, any imperfections could be corrected under the provisions of Section 168, Chapter 46, 1935 C.S.A.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice
Burke concur.
No. 14632. Appeal and Error; Damages; Bond. Cline, et al.
v. Heron. Decided May 24, 1940. District Court, Denver. Hon.
Joseph J. Walsh, Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
• FACTS: A. Lower court, in previous trial gave judgment for
possession of real estate and damages to plaintiff. Defendant went to
supreme court on writ of error and posted bond providing for the payment of the judgment, interest and costs and "any damages which may
be awarded by said supreme court in consequence of the delay occasioned by said writ of error," etc.
B. The supreme court affirmed judgment of lower court, possession was returned to plaintiff and the judgment of lower court paid.
C. Thereafter plaintiff prosecuted proceedings in lower court
and obtained further judgment for damages occasioned by defendant's
possession of property during proceedings on writ of error.

HELD:

1.

Lower court had no jurisdiction on latter matter
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because condition of bond was that the subsequent damages, if any,
were to be determined by the supreme court.
2. A motion or petition to assess damages should have been filed
in the supreme court.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bakke, Mr. Justice
Knous and Mr. Justice Burke concur.
Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bock not participating.
No. 14597. School Teachers' Pensions; Compromise; School
Districts. School District No. 1, Denver, etc. v. Faker. Decided
July 1, 1940. District Court, Denver. Hon. Henry A. Hicks, Judge.
Reversed. En Banc.
FACTS:
A.
Suit brought under Declaratory Judgment Act
to have determined whether, under the facts alleged, plaintiff, a school
teacher, is entitled to a pension under Sections 250-254, Chapter 146,
1935 C.S.A.
B. Differences had arisen between teacher and school district
and after much conflict and litigation a release agreement was entered
into whereby her then pending mandamus action to reinstate her
was dismissed with prejudice.
C. The teacher now seeks to avoid the effects of the release on
the ground that the school district had no authority to compromise
and enter into the release agreement.
HELD: 1. School districts may sue or be sued and they have
the power to compromise actions and claims.
2. The law favors compromises and settlements of disputed
claims.
3. The alleged statutory right of a teacher to a pension may
be waived or released by her.
4. Whether teacher did or did not have proper legal advice at
time of agreement can not control judgment of court in this action.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock.

No. 14763.

Criminal Law; Sealed Verdicts.

Decided July 1,

1940.

Dunklee, Judge.

Reversed.

District Court, Denver.

Denny v. People.
Hon. George F.

En Banc.

HELD:
1. Where, in a criminal trial, it is agreed that the jury
may bring in at opening of court a sealed verdict, it was error for the
trial court to instruct the jury that the opening of the court would be

January 30, 1940 (a week later than the verdict ordinarily would
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have been returned), where such part of the istruction was included
without presence, knowledge or consent of defendant or his attorney.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
No. 14617. Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Motive; Witnesses. Joe Coates v. People. Decided July 1, 1940. District
Court, Denver. Hon. Stanley H. Johnson, Judge. Affirmed. En
Banc.
HELD:
1. In a murder trial, it was permissible to show other
crimes where they show a motive for the crime charged, that being one
of the elements of the crime.
2. Evidence of assaults and threats prior to the killing are part
of the res gestae and admissible; and although some of the evidence
was immaterial and incompetent when the same elements of conduct
continued down to the very evening of the scene, they constitute an
inseverable chain of circumstances and are admissible.
3. Surprise, permitting cross-examination of prosecution's own
witness by prosecution, ordinarily may not be claimed unless the
testimony of the witness is affirmative, hostile or prejudicial to the
party by whom he was called. But the rule is subject to some exceptions, for example, where it appears that a witness is giving testimony
contrary to the reasonable expectation of the party calling him, such
party should be allowed to cross-examine such witness for the purpose
of refreshing his recollection. The trial court did not abuse its discretion under the facts in permitting the cross-examination.
4. While it may have been error for the court to permit the introduction in evidence of a statement made by one witness a short
time after the homicide, it was not prejudicial.
5.
" 'While in itself, as a general proposition, the circumstance
that the court excluded similar evidence may not justify the admission
of that which is improper, it may mitigate the transgression.' "
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bock and Mr. Chief
Justice Hilliard dissent.

No. 1475 1. Unemployment Compensation; Employees. Brannaman, et al. v. Richlow Manufacturing Company. Decided July 1,
1940. District Court, Denver. Hon. Robert W. Steele, Judge.
Modified and affirmed. En Banc.
HELD:
1. Words and phrases are to be construed according
to the common and approved usage of the language unless they have
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law.
2. One who acts as a company's secretary, receiving no wage,
and whose duties are limited to the performance of the formal functions
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required by the statutes and the company's by-laws, and who performs no other service for it is not in the "employment" of the company within the meaning of the Colorado Unemployment Compensation Act.
3. While the state act adopted the definition of "employment"
as set out in the Federal Act, it can not be said that where the state
act specifically defines a term, the Federal Act may broaden or restrict
the state definition.
4. It was not the intention of the state legislature to repeal its
definition of "employment" by adopting Section 19 (f) (7) of Chapter 167A, 1939 Supp. 1935 C.S.A.
5. The allowance of interest on the refund of the tax paid was
erroneous. (Section 14 (c) of the Act.)
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bock dissents.

No. 14613. Negligence; Physicians and Surgeons. Pearson v.
Norman. Decided July 1, 1940. District Court, Pueblo. Hon.
Harry Leddy, Judge. Reversed. In Dept.
HELD: 1. In an action against a physician for negligence in
diagnosis and treatment of a spinal injury, it was error for the trial
court to non-suit the plaintiff where there was evidence of plaintiff
that defendant told him there was no fracture and sent him home and
gave him no further treatments, and where evidence showed there was
a fracture and the plaintiff did not get well. It was a matter for the
jury.
2. Negligence may consist of either wrongful action or wrongful inaction.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
No. 14745.
Workmen's Compensation. Industrial Commission v. McKenna, et al. Decided July 1, 1940. District Court, Lake
County. Hon. William H. Luby, Judge. Affirmed. In Dept.
HELD:
1. 'There is no provision in the law requiring widow
to permit autopsy on body of deceased husband in order to be entitled to benefits of workmen's compensation.
2. Acute heart dilation brought on by overexertion is an accident within meaning of statute.
3. Circumstantial evidence and opinion evidence of a qualified
physician, uncontradicted, is competent to establish the fact.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
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No. 14387.
Water Rights. Otto Lumber Company v. Water
Supply and Storage Company. Decided July 1, 1940. District
Court, Larimer County. Hon. Frederick W. Clark, Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
HELD: 1. A statutory proceeding for change in point of diversion has a 'limited scope and an extraneous issue cannot be litigated
therein.
2. A decree must be accepted at its face value. If the decree
for some reason other than lack of jurisdiction appearing on its face,
should be vulnerable to attack, the attack can not be collateral, but
must be made directly in an appropriate action other than the statutory
proceeding itself.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Young dissents.

No. 14667. Instructions. Jackson v. Trainor. Decided July
1, 1940. County Court, Crowley County. Hon. E. M. Stroud,
Judge. Affirmed. En Banc.
HELD:
1. As a general rule, in instructing the jury, nondirection constitutes prejudice only if a proper instruction is tendered
by the complaining party to fill the alleged gap.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
No. 14757. Criminal Law; Operating Auto Under Influence
of Liquor; Principal and Accessory. Quintana v. People. Decided
July 1, 1940. District Court, Boulder County. Hon. Claude C.
Coffin, Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
HELD:
1. Where it appears that two parties, P. and the defendant, were in an automobile which struck another car causing the
death of an occupant of the latter, and that some time later both parties, under influence of liquor and covered with blood were found,
separately, away from the scene of the accident; where it appears that
both had been in the car, both were intoxicated, neither knew much
about the accident, and each accused the other of driving the car, and
where it appears that the car was owned by P.'s father, and P.'s driver's
license was found in the car, there might be sufficient evidence that P.
was the principal, but there is no competent evidence that would establish defendant as a principal.
2. It is not sufficient to make the defendant an accessory to show
only that he was in the car and under the influence of liquor at the
time of the accident. There was nothing in the evidence to show that
he gave any encouragement, by word or act, to the commission of the
offense of causing a death by operating a car while under the influence

DICTA

239

of liquor in a careless and reckless manner, and with wanton and reckless disregard of human life and safety.
3.
Under such facts, where both are tried together and convicted, there may be sufficient evidence to establish that defendant was
an accessory during the fact, but he can not be considered as a principal and punished as such. The penalty being different, it is a distinct
offense.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.

No. 14670. Constitutional Law; Pensions for Justices of
Supreme Court; Pensionable Status; Severability; Statutory Construction. Bedford, etc. vs. White and Adams. Decided April 8, 1940.
District Court, Denver. Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge. Reversed.
En Banc.
HELD: 1. Supreme Court justices who reached the statutory
age of retirement while in office and while the act was in effect, may
receive pensions from the state.
2. A pensionable status as to original grant will support a claim
to a later increase.
3. If the official was not in office when the act became operative
he must at least have reached the specified age while in office, or if not
reaching that age until out of office, the act must have been applicable
while he was in office in order to establish a "pensionable status".
4. The claimants in this case are not entitled to the pensions
since neither was in office when the legislation became effective, and
neither reached the statutory age until after the expiration of the service;
and the pension act could have no possible effect on inducing them to
enter the service, remain in it or retire from it.
5. As to these claimants the pension is either extra compensation after the service has been rendered, a violation of Section 28,
Article V, State Constitution, or an appropriation for a benevolent
purpose, in violation of Section 34, Article V, or both.
6. As to the status of former Justice Garrigues, no decision
made since he is not a party, except to point out distinctions to effect
that while he was not in office when act was passed, he did reach
statutory age before retiring, and also, his pension has been paid for
a long period of time without question.
7. Persuasive argument for the constitutionality of an act,
where the question is a close one, is a "contemporaneous construction,"
or long continued construction and action by other departments of
the government charged therewith.
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8. The act of 1925 has never been questioned, and the act of
1939 is a mere extension of it.
"The conclusion is irresistible that
had the law makers known that their attempted inclusion of" a class
of people into which the claimants fall "was invalid they would have
passed the bill with that class excluded. Legislative intent is thus clear
and in such case the invalid provision of the statute falls and the valid
stands. This is a well known rule of severability."
9. The rule of severability is equally applicable where the valid
and void provisions of an act are found in the same section.
10. Where the enacting words of a later act are, "amended to
read as follows", and the repealing section is "all acts and parts of
acts in conflict", the rule as to such legislation is that: "the portion of
the original which is reenacted in substance is not repealed, but the
amendment is construed as an uninterrupted continuation thereof.
Substantial changes, new matter, and repeals by omission, are considered
as new legislation and hence to be construed as such."
11.
The Supreme Court Pension Act of 1939 is invalid only
so far as it includes those not included in the act of 1925, not in office
when either was effective and not in office when they reached the age
provided by either.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Young, Mr. Justice
Bakke and Mr. Justice Knous dissent.

No. 14634. Trusts; Receivers; Equity; Jurisdiction. Melville
et al. v. Weybrew et al. Decided April 8, 1940. District Court, Denver. Hon. Henry A. Hicks, Judge. Affirmed. En Banc.
FACTS: A. Plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be holders of certificates of beneficial interests in the defendant District Landowners
Trust, filed a complaint seeking dissolution of the trust and distribution of its assets to the beneficiaries on the ground that the alleged purpose of the trust was to secure certain water rights or construct an irrigation system and that because of its inability to perform such service,
the trust failed and no longer needs to continue its existence.
B. Certain other charges were made against the trustees, such as
commission of ultra vires acts and misapplication and conversion of
funds. An accounting was sought.
C. Also a petition for appointment of a receiver pendente lite was
filed. The trial court granted the petition for a receiver and matter was
taken to Supreme Court under Rule 18.
HELD:
1. The district court has jurisdiction in fields of equity:
and the jurisdiction over trusts, being always within the domain of a
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court of equity, such court has the power to terminate a trust and have
the property distributed where the trust is impossible of fulfillment.
2. A court of equity has inherent power to displace trustees by
substituting a receiver whenever the case is brought within the general
equitable principles concerning the appointment of receivers.
3. A receiver may be appointed for a trust, where action is pending, to determine the distributive shares of the beneficiaries.
4. Appointment of a receiver ordinarily rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.
5. Where certain beneficiaries of a trust allege they have an equitable right in, and claim to, the subject matter, they have the right to
maintain the action and ask ancillary equitable relief without the joinder
of other beneficiaries under the trust.
6. A beneficiary of a trust may bring suit to terminate it, where
the trust has expired, notwithstanding a provision in the declaration of
the trust to the effect that he shall not do so "except, at the expiration
of the term of this trust." He has a right to have the court determine
whether or not the trust has expired.
7. Under the allegations, mere injunctive relief would not constitute adequate, complete and effectual remedy to plaintiffs.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bouck, Mr. Justice
Bock and Mr. Justice Burke dissent.

No. 145 19.

Insurance; Date of Policy; Grace Period; Extension

Insurance. Business Men's Assurance Co. v.. Davies, et at. Decided
April 8, 1940. District Court, La Plata County. Hon. John B.
O'Rourke, Judge. Reversed. In Dept.
1. The effective date of a policy of life insurance is that
HELD:
date agreed upon and long recognized by the parties as shown by the
policy, correspondence between company and assured and conduct of
the parties.
2. Where a clause in the policy provides that if the cash or loan
value is not sufficient to cover the next premium, upon failure to pay
the premium, it shall automatically be extended from the date of default
and for such period as would be paid by the cash surrender value, the
grace period and the extension period run from the same date; the grace
period does not begin to run after the expiration date of the extended
insurance.
Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
Mr. Justice Burke concur.
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A LAWYER'S VIEWPOINT
The following excerpt is taken from an address
before a meeting of the American Bankers Association by Mr. John H. Freeman of the law firm of
Fulbright, Crooker and Freeman, of Houston,
Texas, on the subject:

ADVANTAGES OF
THE CORPORATE EXECUTOR
AND TRUSTEE
"Action or lack of action by a corporate trustee in a given matter
is not the result of impulse or of sudden notion-rather, it results
from consideration, study and deliberate judgment, usually, of a group
constituting a trust committee.
"This committee acts collectively; it approves or disapproves,
authorizes or rejects, and the record of its acts is a permanent archive
of the bank. Under its supervision and control are the various employees and officers who actually look after and handle the trust
property-available to it are all of the information and data about any
given question or matter that the various departments of the bank or
trust company can assemble or provide."
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